A return to the top three is very much on the cards for Ferrari, but overhauling Red Bull is likely a bridge too far. Dunbar/Motorsport Images

The constraints of this season make it difficult to judge what kinds of gains are realistic, although we can make some assumptions. Even Binotto concedes that making the 1.4% relative gain to Mercedes is not going to happen, and history supports him on this. While there was a time when there could be huge performance swings thanks to the pace of technology, whether it was some new innovation or refining an idea that had already appeared, such strides are rare these days.

To put that into context, during the V6 turbo hybrid era that started in 2014, there are only five cases of teams gaining more than 1% in terms of relative performance from one year to the next. One was Manor from 2015-16, a leap of 2.68% thanks to the massive struggles of the revived team in the first of those years – hardly a representative set of circumstances.

Another was Williams, which was so catastrophically bad in 2019 that even a 1.470% leap last year was only good enough for it to join the ‘Class C’ group of strugglers at the back. Renault, now Alpine, gained 1.285% from 2016-17, another exceptional case given the car in the first of those years was desperately underdeveloped under the ailing previous ownership prior to it being taken over. It was a similar story for Racing Point, now Aston Martin, from 2019-2020, which gained 1.104% but with its 2019 car compromised by the previous ownership’s struggles.

That leaves just McLaren, which gained 1.290% from 2018-19. That’s a more interesting case, as it was a team that had some serious weaknesses laid bare by its switch from Honda to Renault propulsion, which was seen as a panacea prior but simply proved the engine had been a lightning rod to attract all the criticism. McLaren had chassis problems too, and fixing them allowed for the big step.

You might argue a team like Ferrari this year is comparable because the SF1000 was certainly a package beset by a series of unusual problems. That’s what makes it the team with the biggest potential to catapult forward. But of the teams that did well last year, it’s unlikely we’ll see anything spectacular. Red Bull, for example, has been making slow progress, with steps of 0.161%, 0.145% and 0.014% relative to the pace over the past three years. Progress, yes, but at that rate it will be another six seasons before it gets on terms with Mercedes.

This is why the major rule changes next year are so tantalizing. Not only are the technical regulations governing the car undergoing their most dramatic changes in grand prix history, but they combine with the arrival of the cost-cap this year, and the more equitable distribution of team payments to create the conditions for some big changes. That’s why so many teams will be turning their maximum development resources to the 2022 project very quickly this year. Already, significant R&D has been going into next year’s car by all teams.
The FW42 that Williams campaigned in 2019 was so far adrift of its rivals that the sizeable upgrade delivered ahead of 2020 only managed to bring the team onto equal terms with its lower mid-pack rivals. Dunbar/Motorsport Images

The last time there were significant aerodynamic changes was in 2017. Then, the performance shifts weren’t massive, save for the aforementioned gains by Renault. The biggest beneficiary was Ferrari, which gained 0.6% relative to the pace and started to win races again after a dry 2016. But the most famous example is the 2009 rule changes, which introduced the ‘skinny’ aero regs.

That season actually laid the foundations for today, with the Brawn team that had been revived from the embers of Honda winning the championship and Red Bull emerging as a race-winning force. Red Bull leaped from seventh in the constructors’ championship in 2008 to second, with Honda turning ninth into first.

The Brawn example, in particular, is often misused as an example of what can be achieved by focusing on next year’s car. That team required some big changes after Ross Brawn’s arrival late in 2007 and it was logical to focus on that, along with investing much of what would have been its 2008 development budget into the 2009 car for new regulations. That made it arguably the most expensive F1 car ever produced at that time, as Honda, despite its struggles, was not short of cash. The 50bhp deficit to Mercedes that Honda suffered from in 2008 was also eliminated by the change of engine supplier. As for Red Bull, it had invested heavily, recruited the best and needed the rules reset to get onto an even keel up against the rest.

Such conditions are rare and the teams best-placed to exploit the 2022 regulations remain the best-funded. What’s more, Honda went from around 1.0% off the pace at the end of 2008 to setting the pace at the start of 2009, which was enough to make the leap. Today, there’s that 1% chasm between the leading teams and the front of the midfield, a gap that was solidified by the 2017 rule changes.

Coming back to this season, the fascinating thing is that this is a challenge of readjustment to a minor but impactful rules tweak rather than a clean sheet of paper. As the saying goes, shares may go down as well as up, and there will be teams whose gaps in understanding prove more costly. But it should be within the realms only of an adjustment of the competitive order rather than a revolution – albeit with enough of a challenge to make the season interesting.

The hopes for that revolution must wait for next year. But as history shows, rules changes can also stretch the gaps between teams and leave many playing catch-up. In this world where relative gains count though, it’s no coincidence that the pre-eminent force – Mercedes – has the most stable numbers for the past seven years, usually making gains or losses measured by less than a tenth of a percent.